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Fear and Loathing in the Planning Profession:
Ten Comments on the Political Factor
Charles G. Pattison
Basedon the author's experiences with local and state land useplanningprograms in North Carolina, Florida,
and Virginia, this article concludes that the value oftechnicalplanning skills must be considered secondary to
the more significant and unpredictable world ofpolitical reality. To integratepolitics into theplanningprocess,
the planner must have the determination to see the job through, more than a passing awareness ofpublic
relations, and the ability to project fairness above all else.
Politics is the key to successfully making a difference in
the planning field. Several situations involving serious
political players, who also happened to be in a position to
make or break long term planning efforts, have colored my
thinking. I hope my comments are challenged, argued, and
debated. Outrage and agreement are also welcome. More
than anything else, I want to see the political process
identified and studied as a key to planning successes and
failures. I hate politics. I love politics. I can go either way.
You have heard the philosophical question: Does a tree
make noise when it falls in a forest with no one around to
hear it? Planners should be askinga similar question: Does
planning make an impact in the real world, if through the
political process, solutions and plans are never adopted or
implemented? I say no. Planning must be an integral part
ofthe political process. And although I do not recommend
that all planners carry snake bite kits to counter political
venom, it has always worked for me.
Fourteen years as a professional planner is a lot of time
in which to make mistakes. I have found several things that
would have helped me accomplish more and gain better
understanding from my experiences. Ten of my observa-
tions are discussed below.
ONE
Do not take any credit for developing a land use
plan. Until it has been adopted and implemented
in the political arena, you have not done very
much.
Your real job began once the last public hearing was held
and your elected officials adopted a comprehensive plan.
Implementation is ihe critical component of the solution,
whatever the issue. There are many examples of successful
strategies and major efforts to create state or local enabling
legislation, and similar examples of difficult, tedious and
time consuming efforts to get planning programs adopted,
but few examples that result in implementation that ad-
dresses the problems at hand. The planning triad is made
up this way: technical competence, .05 percent; necessary
legal framework (local, state, regional or federal), .05 per-
cent; and implementation, 99.9 percent. Why should any-
one be satisfied with anything less than the resolution ofthe
problem at hand? It certainly is easier this way, and there
are more examples ofsuccess at the first two levels than the
last. Maybe it is because we are not willing to look at what
we do in the comprehensive way that we preach. More
likely, it concerns the relative state and status of the plan-
ning profession generally: we arewhere the medical profes-
sion was when bleeding the patient and using leeches were
everyday events.
Are we advanced in solving problems if solutions are
never implemented because politically they could never
work? Why should anyone get credit for such solutions?
Planners are still banging rocks together as tools while the
political system has discovered metal. Until the responsi-
bility for understanding, evaluating and participating in the
political process of implementation is accepted, we are
relegated to the path of little real effectiveness.
The planning profession gives itself too much credit for
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preparing and presenting solutions that will not be imple-
mented. Instead of looking at this all too common result
pessimistically, implementation failures must be consid-
ered in relative terms. Planning failure only occurs when
planners divorce themselves from the political process and
give up. This is easy to do with solutions that are too
technical, time consuming, expensive, and politically tenu-
ous. The answer is maintaining sufficient fortitude and de-
termination to regroup and try again after the first, second,
third, fourth and following setbacks. You have to be there
to have a chance.
The state ofFlorida designated the Florida Keys an Area of
Critical State Concern in 1975. It took eleven years, until
1986, to get a comprehensive land use plan adopted locally
that met state planning standards and land development
regulations. Many different local and state politicians, ap-
pointed officials and various citizen groups participated in
more than 100formalpublic hearings. All ofthis was the easy
part. The planningprogram will have failed unless the real
objective—protecting the unique environment ofthe Keys while
providingfor appropriate economic growth-is implemented.
TWO
Make sure you speak to the elected official(s) last
when policy issues are being decided.
Regardless of the promises made, it is convenient for
politicians to be affected most by the person getting in the
last word. This usually relates more to private rather than
public conversations, unless the decision is already locked.
Make sure any commitment you get is made as close as
possible to the upcoming decision date. If at all possible,
get the official's personal calendar for that last, critical
week. Know who else is making contact, anticipate their
comments, and have a response ready.
After spending a considerable amount of time with the
swing vote commissioner on an upcoming subdivision vari-
ance, I left convinced that I had the necessary assurance that
the vote would be 3-2 in myfavor. Igot the vote right, but the
wrong result. I discovered later that the owners ofthe subdi-
vision had lunch with the commissioner one hourprior to the
public vote, and managed to discount all of the arguments I
had made. Ilearned not to leave such politicians unattended,
especially immediately before critical votes.
THREE
Environmental rationale carries less weight than
economic reality for the politician.
This should also be true for the planner, but for some
reason, planners have the impression that subjective argu-
ments about environmental quality do not have to be
countered by objective measures of economic gain. I see
frequent failures based on this concept, and limited suc-
cesses when economic factors are appropriately consid-
ered. I also see abuses of economic information when
planners are either untrained or unaware of what is avail-
able to them or are unable to objectively evaluate what has
been "cooked up" by a project applicant. Unfortunately,
this is a briar patch no matter which wayyou turn. Environ-
mental and economic information is frequently subjective,
although there is always some objective information. The
planner should be in a position to know the relative merits
of the information presented in order to develop and
present the most informed opinion.
TheAvtexPlant in Front Royal, Virginia, was closedin!989
after it had dumped PCBs into the Shenandoah River for
severalyears in violation ofnumerous state andfederal water
quality standards. It was the sole production source in the
United States of carbonized rayon filament rocket motor
nozzles for military and civilian applications. Wlien the
federal government learned of the problem, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency did nothing, and did notpass along
what it did know to state agencies, which were seemingly
incapable ofmaking such determinations.
Not only did the state do nothing, one of its U.S. Senators
helpedobtainfederalfunds to keep theplant in operation. The
plant contributed 400jobs to the local economy. Only a year
earlier, it employed 1,300 people, but other environmental
transgressions caused employment to decline. After the news-
papers described the plant 's operations, things began to charige.
Even then, thepublicityprobably would nothave amounted to
much except for these revelations taking place during a re-
cently concluded gubernatorial race and thefact that another
facility was coming on line in Tennessee.
FOUR
Know your elected and appointed officials'
constituencies, and anticipate which ones may
address them on a given issue. Your support base
should be broad enough to include one
representative of each.
Your ability to influence decisions is directly related to
the number of constituencies supporting your position.
Without a majority, you do not really have a position that
means anything. In the absence of credible constituencies,
you should be in a good position to directly influence the
decision makers. Not enough use is made of public opinion
polls as a basis for understanding community thinking.
These are invaluable in targeting policy areas for public
workshops and education.
The planning community is not doing enough to help
define issues; it is too concerned with presenting solutions.
We are in the business of selling ourselves, and selling
requires some concept of sales, marketing and public rela-
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tions. It is taken for granted that planners either intuitively
know such things or that this is not part of our concern.
Support from constituencies is rarely given; it is gained by
hard, time-consuming outreach work. Short term results
from such efforts are rare, but that should not be the focus
anyway. A well-informed public is the best chance for
gaining constituents and influencing policy.
The initial efforts to adopt a performance-based growth
management plan for the Florida Keys were made with no
constituency in mind. Planning concepts of environmental
protection, adequate public facilities, and appropriate eco-
nomic development were sold locally to no one in particular.
Progress was made only after the politicalforces affecting the
five-membercountycommissionwere identified. That under-
standing altered the approach and time spent with various
commissioners, and led to a correctjudgment that the wrong
commissioner had been identified as the critical third vote.
FIVE
Understand the dynamics ofyour local political
situation as it relates to regional, state and federal
interests.
Political forces in your community may or may not be
locally based. When state or federal programs are involved,
there is a high probability that outside interests will be a
factor. A state program will usually have the broadest
support base outside of a local area, especially if it is
implementing controversial legislation. Although outspo-
ken local opposition is likely to influence the local political
situation, its effect outside those political boundaries will
be limited. When a strong commitment exists at the state
level to carry out what is perceived locally to be controver-
sial, there must be a significant political constituency at
work.
It comes down to the number of votes affected locally
versus the number outside the same jurisdiction. Since it is
likely that some local support will exist for such programs,
even in the face of vocal protests from the majority of
elected officials, the planner has to perform the delicate
and diplomatic balancing act to stay the course. Remember
that although public pronouncements of outrage may play
well locally, they will have little effect elsewhere. And more
than anything else, this will limit your maneuvering room
which is always needed politically.
Powerfulpoliticalforces outside the Keys community influ-
enced Florida officials in the approval and acceptance of a
Keys land use plan. Controversial government actions in-
volved one vote ofthe Florida Cabinet, an intervening ruling
of the Florida Supreme Court, and a law of the Florida
Legislature designating the Florida Keys an Area of Critical
State Concern. With only 20,000 registered voters in the Keys,
about half of whom supported a state role in local land use
planning, it was apparent that state political leaders had little
to lose in supporting such efforts. In fact, given the power of
several statewide environmental groups, it is good politics to
support and defend the state imposed land useplanningpro-
gram. It is also important that the largest newspaper in the
state strongly supports good environmentalplanningfor the
Keys. Its position always demands the attention of any
noteworthy politicalfigures.
SIX
Always expect a politician to make something
other than a rational decision when money is
involved.
No decision made in the political area is immune to
irrational thinking. Irrational thinking, however, is a mis-
nomer for the political process. It should be labeled politi-
cal expediency. This can mean many things, but more and
more, as large sums of public funds are involved, it fre-
quently means either budget shifting or tax increases. Both
can be detrimental to a politician's good health.
However, paying for a program solution must be part of
the planning solution. Feasible funding sources and meth-
ods of payment are as much a part of any answer as the
technical planning component. The easier it is for the
elected official to write something off because of cost, the
more likely it is that you will fail. When infeasible funding
sources are part of the solution, there is really no solution
at all.
The performance-based growth management plan for the
Florida Keys is a staffintensive device. Before it was adopted,
it was obvious that the lack of computer assistance had
severely hampered the existing staff's ability to address mul-
tipleplanning issues. At budget time, it was easy to denypleas
for assistance, even though the benefits ofreducedprocessing
time, betterpermit tracking, and substantially improved report
writing were well documented. It was always morepolitically
expedient to appropriatefundsfor things other than an expen-
sive mainframe computer.
During the plan adoption process, an astute consultant
recommended that the planning department be funded as a
special tax district, with its operating costsfunded by building
permit fees and state assistance grants. Previously, all such
money simply went into the generalfund and was politically
doled out. There never seemed to be enough money for the
planning department, given the developing animosities over
tougher land use plan implementation.
However, once the special taxing district began collecting
funds that could only be usedforplanningpurposes, we were
able to secure unanimous approval for the purchase of the
needed computer system. This was done with the support of
the county administration, which saw the computer as the
basis for developing its own system, and the local building
industry, which saw reduced processing time and improved
permit tracking to be in its best interest.
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SEVEN
Planners do not have divine insight into land use
planning problems and solutions.
For many planners, there is something threatening about
receiving proposals from anywhere but their offices, whether
they be from laymen, other planners or politicians. It is as
if any idea or concept not originating from that office is
somehow tainted. There is no single correct solution.
Political reality usually means that what works in one
community will not work the same way in another. You
must be objective enough to look at any suggestion, what-
ever the source.
Moreover, you should be wary of solutions that have
worked in other communities and are applied to a different
setting with little attempt to modify them in consideration
of local situations. By the time such solutions are filtered
through the political reality mill, complete change, if not
outright rejection, can be expected. Those that are not
should be suspect-either the decision maker does not un-
derstand what she or he is being asked to approve, or they
simplyhavenotreadit. Watch out. No matter what the cir-
cumstances, solutions adopted without insight into the
problem at hand are doomed to failure. Efforts to slip con-
troversial regulations or poorly understood policies past an
unsuspecting board are rarely successful in the long run,
and can hurt your credibility tremendously. The planning
professional's job is to educate the elected and appointed
officials on the pros and cons
of a proposed solution, with
the final decision, even the "in-
correct" one, reserved to them
alone. The planner's privilege
is to make an informed rec-
ommendation.
The contiguous lot rule, made
part ofthe Florida Keys Com-
prehensive Plan, was poorly
understood legally controver-
sial, and was transferredfrom a
somewhat similar regulation
that was originally part of the
SanibelIslandPlan. Discount-
ing localprotestationsfrom lay
and professional people, the
political leadership adopted the
rule with little real understand-
ing ofit. This element ofa con-
troversial regulation designed
to lower residential development
densities in otherwise develo-
pable andpreviously platted and
recorded subdivisions, limited
owners with two lots to building
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Citizens' first impression ofthe CoastalArea ManagementAct (CAMA):
Stealingproperty rights in North Carolina
only one residence. Although the second lot could be used as
permanentopen space, any resale investment value was effec-
tively eliminated The rule stoodfor three years before being
struck down in a legal challenge. A great deal of credibility,
time and effort was lost in attempting to implement this
concept. Theflaw was not in the legal aspects ofthe rule, as
questionable as those might appear. It rests with the under-
standing that the planners knew "best"—and besides, it had
"worked"somewhere else. It was notpublicly acknowledged
that the rule had also failed a similar legal challenge in the
other locality.
EIGHT
Politicians have learned to laugh at themselves—
they should. Planners take themselves too
seriously--we need to learn from the politicians.
The first time you are verbally attacked in public by an
elected official, it is hard to be amused. Planners are such
easy targets. Any politician usually looks good abusing,
criticizing and severely questioning the planning staff. Many
constituents enjoy this type of entertainment, and many
private sector employees are willing to accept the stere-
otyped picture of the pencil pushing bureaucrat sitting
behind a desk, doing whatever it is thatwe do, knowing that
we could not get a job in the real world. You should not be
concerned about such commentary. I find that it usually
comes from the less intelligent
segment. Motivation and intent
are infrequently vicious, although
it is always best to assume that
barking dogs will bite. Consider
the source and enjoy it forwhat it
is. Accept a basic public service
maxim: praise is rare, criticism is
constant, and work is never end-
ing.
In my previous position, I had
only been in the office afew months
when our local senator and the
former representative were calling
for my dismissal. I was being at-
tackedfor designing a land acqui-
sition program to benefit wealthy
people instead ofsmall lot owners.
That this was completely untrue
hadno bearingon die matter. These
two gentlemen were determined not
to let the facts get in the way. Al-
though not entertainingfor me at
the time, everyone else seemed to
enjoy reading about this in the local
newspapers. After thefuror died
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down, and things got back to normal, I enjoyed the realiza-
tion that what these two had done was to solidify local
support for my efforts. And I was always sure that the
incidentwas in no way related to aprevious episode in which
my officedenied the representative 'srequestfora subdivision
and impactfee exemption.
NINE
Elected officials have every right to hear rational
explanations ofvarious policy options and make
what any plannerwould deem the wrong choice.
The planner's role is to analyze a situation, present
alternatives, comment on advantages and disadvantages,
and make a recommendation. The last is a privilege only.
Shame on those and their processes that do not make or
allow recommendations. We should not be accorded the
luxury of presenting the facts without recommending a
solution. I am comforted, however, that planners do not
have the final say. If a poor choice is made, it is not the
fault of the elected official. It is the professional's fault.
Planners too often hide behind the excuse that politics
affected the outcome. It did. It always does. It always will.
The resulting failure is because of the planner's inability
to understand, activate, motivate and influence the politi-
cal forces that caused the decision. This can be tough to
do. Vision and foresight are hard to come by in the
political arena. Ostriches, with their heads buried in the
sand, show as much vision and bravery as many of our
elected officials. Ifa planner thinks a contrary outcome is
likely, she or he is obligated to makean effort to sway those
actors. This will not happen during the final meeting be-
fore a public audience. A planner must be involved in this
process at several levels. Dependingon your skill, this may
or may not affect your term of service. The only place this
can be learned effectively is on the job, but some graduate
coursework in the planning curriculum would be a good
start.
In order to alter aprimary sanddune underregulations im-
plementing North Carolina 's Coastal Area Management
Act, a variance was needed from the gubematorialty ap-
pointed Coastal Resources Commission (CRC). It so hap-
pened that one of the more diligent localities stopped a
pwminent contractorfrom completing such an alteration
without apermit. The staffargument aboutprecedents being
set if the regulation were not followed and supporting the
localpermit officer carried little weight. The case was heard,
and the variance was granted by a wide margin. We blamed
it on politics; however, it was ourfault that the case was lost.
We did nothing to help the CRC deny the variance. In fact,
we made ithard by relyingon it to do the right thing. The right
thing would have been for us to have local and state testi-
monyopposingthe variance. We mistakenlydid not thinkthat
was ourjob.
TEN
In public planning agencies, elected and appointed
officials should be involved and aware of personnel
and administrative decisions made by planning
managers.
Members of planning commissions, zoning boards, and
other appointed and elected bodies, have a vested interest
in their planning operations, especially as this relates to
staff quality and continuity. Management is one of the
profession's most difficult responsibilities, and there is
always room for improvement. Personnel decisions in
particular can have a tremendous impact on staff morale
and public perceptions. I can easily count the number of
personnel management courses I had while in school. No
one told me that running an agency of 45 employees is
something very different from a 45-person office in a large
state bureaucracy. I had no courses in employee motiva-
tion, influence peddling, budget analyses, personnel man-
agement, and similar business related matters. And no one
told me that in an agency of this size, more than one-third
of my time could be consumed by personnel matters. Sug-
gestions on such items are another area where comments
from the outside are typically considered intrusions. But
elected and appointed officials usually have one or more
members with business backgrounds that can be effectively
used to help. Most jurisdictions have policies and ordi-
nances that prevent blatant interference. Be careful that
you are not seen as favoring one individual's input over
another ifyou choose this option. In most cases,you will be
better served by going outside your system entirely so that
any charges of favoritism or influence can be handled.
/ workedfor an agency that had a 75percent turnover rate
in one year. The three-year average approached 50 percent.
Its administrative operations were totally the domain of the
executive director, exceptfor adoption ofthe annual budget.
Although staffpromotions were announced to our council, it
had no opportunity to observe the process used to grant, or
deny, such promotions. No council member ever interviewed
for replacement personnel or spoke with staff choosing to
leave. The explanation alwaysgiven the councilwas thatmost
ofthe turnover involved entry levelpeople, and thatsuch turn-
over was to be expected. A turnover rate this high should be
expectedofan agencythatshows little regardfor its employees.
It always should be expected of any agency that allows an
executive director total control overpersonnel matters. Whether
a board of directors is appointed or elected, it must know
enough about its chiefexecutive officer to monitor a situation
and step in ifneed be.
